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Abstract
Privacy against an adversary (AD) that tries to detect the underlying privacy-sensitive data distribu-
tion is studied. The original data sequence is assumed to come from one of the two known distributions,
and the privacy leakage is measured by the probability of error of the binary hypothesis test carried
out by the AD. A management unit (MU) is allowed to manipulate the original data sequence in an
online fashion, while satisfying an average distortion constraint. The goal of the MU is to maximize the
minimal type II probability of error subject to a constraint on the type I probability of error assuming an
adversarial Neyman-Pearson test, or to maximize the minimal error probability assuming an adversarial
Bayesian test. The asymptotic exponents of the maximum minimal type II probability of error and the
maximum minimal error probability are shown to be characterized by a Kullback-Leibler divergence
rate and a Chernoff information rate, respectively. Privacy performances of particular management
policies, the memoryless hypothesis-aware policy and the hypothesis-unaware policy with memory,
are compared. The proposed formulation can also model adversarial example generation with minimal
data manipulation to fool classifiers. Lastly, the results are applied to a smart meter privacy problem,
where the user’s energy consumption is manipulated by adaptively using a renewable energy source in
order to hide user’s activity from the energy provider.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Developments in information technology have drastically changed people’s lives, e.g., smart
homes, smart grids, and e-health. Most of these technologies are based on intelligent algorithms
that provide better use of limited resources thanks to their ability to gather and process more
information about users’ behaviors and preferences. This population-scale collection of personal
user data in return of various utilities is a growing concern, as the collected data can be misused
beyond their intended application. Therefore, guaranteeing user privacy while continuing to
deliver the benefits of such technologies is a fundamental research challenge that must be tackled
in order to enable the adoption of these technologies without being concerned about privacy risks.
Privacy has been studied extensively in recent years for various information systems consider-
ing different privacy measures [2]–[8]. Differential privacy [2], [9], [10] and mutual information
[7], [11], [12] are probably the most commonly studied privacy measures. In [13], Fisher
information is proposed as a privacy measure, and is shown to be a lower bound on the mean
squared error of an unbiased estimation on the privacy. Kullback-Leibler divergence is used as a
privacy measure in [14], [15], while total variation distance is considered in [16], which provides
a bound on the privacy leakage measured by mutual information or maximal leakage [8].
Privacy is particularly difficult to guarantee against ADs employing modern data mining
techniques, which are capable of identifying user behavior with large datasets. With such attacks
in mind, we propose a novel formulation of the privacy leakage problem that can be applied to
many information sharing applications. We assume that the original data is manipulated by the
MU and then shared with a remote entity in an online manner. Our goals are to guarantee that the
shared data satisfies a certain utility constraint, measured by the average distortion between the
original data sequence and the shared sequence, and meanwhile to limit the inference capability of
the AD, who might be the legitimate receiver of the shared data. We assume that the AD performs
an optimal hypothesis test based on the shared data sequence (or the adversarial observation
sequence) and tries to determine a privacy-sensitive underlying hypothesis. Hypothesis test has
previously been considered in the privacy context [17]–[21]. However, different from these
previous works, in which the goal is to increase the reliability of the hypothesis test while
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3guaranteeing privacy, we measure the privacy risk by the error probability of the corresponding
adversarial hypothesis testing problem.
Our problem formulation can also be considered as a model for generating adversarial exam-
ples to attack classifiers, which is a very popular research area due to the increasing adoption
of machine learning techniques in all domains [22]–[25]. These attacks consist of generating
examples that can fool a classifier, despite being very similar to the true distribution of the data
that has been used to train the classifier. Deep neural networks are particularly vulnerable to
such attacks [26]. In our setting, the AD can be considered as the classifier, and we are aiming at
generating adversarial observation sequences that are similar to the original data sequence under
a given distortion constraint, yet will make the detection of the AD as unreliable as possible.
A similar adversarial signal processing problem is studied in [27]–[29], which also considers
independent identically distributed (i.i.d.) original data sequences, distortion-constrained data
manipulation, and hypothesis test based on manipulated sequences. However, the results in this
paper and in [27]–[29] do not imply each other due to the following fundamental differences: i)
We consider an MU to degrade the hypothesis testing accuracy of a passive but informed AD,
and formulate the problems as worst-case analyses; while [27]–[29] consider an active attacker to
degrade the hypothesis testing accuracy of a defender and formulate the problem as a zero-sum
game; ii) we assume the AD to always perform an optimal hypothesis test without the restriction
that the hypothesis test has to be based on the type of the manipulated data sequence as imposed
in [27]–[29]; iii) we also study the scenario in which the MU does not know the hypothesis a
priori.
We study the privacy performance by focusing on the asymptotic error exponent in two
different settings. We consider i) the asymptotic exponent of the maximum minimal type II
probability of error assuming an adversarial Neyman-Pearson test setting, and ii) the asymptotic
exponent of the maximum minimal error probability assuming an adversarial Bayesian test
setting. We show that the asymptotic error exponent can be characterized by a Kullback-Leibler
divergence rate in the first setting, and by a Chernoff information rate in the second. In particular,
we prove that the asymptotic error exponent achieved by the optimal memoryless hypothesis-
aware policy reduces to a single-letter Kullback-Leibler divergence, or a single-letter Chernoff
information. We also consider the hypothesis-unaware policies with memory, and show for both
settings that, the asymptotic error exponent achieved by the optimal memoryless hypothesis-
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Fig. 1. The privacy problem model. The original data sequence {Xi} is i.i.d. generated under the privacy hypothesis h0 or h1.
The management unit (MU) follows a policy to determine the random adversarial observation sequence {Yi} that has to satisfy
a long-term average distortion constraint. The informed adversary (AD) makes an optimal hypothesis test on the privacy based
on the observations.
aware policy is an upper bound on the exponent achieved by the optimal hypothesis-unaware
policy with memory. Here, we generalize the privacy problem model we introduced in [1], present
the omitted proofs of Lemma 1, Lemma 2, Theorem 3, Theorem 4, and modify the proof of
Theorem 1. Additionally, we analyze here the adversarial Bayesian hypothesis test setting.
As an application of the presented theoretical framework, we will consider a smart meter that
reports the energy supply data to an energy provider (EP) at regular time intervals. The EP,
which is the legitimate receiver of the smart meter data, can be considered as the AD in this
setting, that tries to mine the smart meter data beyond the intended utility application, e.g., to
infer the privacy-sensitive user behavior information: presence at home, or electrical appliance
usage patterns. Various privacy-preserving techniques have been developed for the smart meter
privacy problem in recent years, that can be classified into two groups [30]: The methods in
the first group modify the smart meter readings in order to confuse the EP; while the second
group of methods directly modify the energy supply pattern to achieve the same goal [7], [9],
[10], [14], [31]–[34]. The advantage of the second approach is that the smart meters report
truthful readings; therefore, the EP can reliably use their readings for energy provisioning. Both
approaches can be formulated in the general framework proposed in this paper.
In the following, unless otherwise specified, we will denote a random variable by a capital
letter, e.g., X , its realization by the lower-case letter, e.g., x, and its alphabet by the calligraphic
letter, e.g., X . Let Xkt , xkt , and X kt denote a random sequence (Xt, . . . , Xk), its realization
(xt, . . . , xk), and its alphabet Xt×· · ·×Xk, respectively. For simplification, Xk, xk, and X k are
used when t = 1. We use D(·||·) to denote Kullback-Leibler divergence, Dτ (·||·) to denote τ -th
order Re´nyi divergence, C(·, ·) to denote Chernoff information, and | · | to denote set cardinality.
March 12, 2019 DRAFT
5II. SYSTEM MODEL
The considered privacy problem is illustrated in Fig. 1. The original data sequence {Xi}
is assumed to come from one of two possible distributions depending on the binary privacy
hypothesis H , which can be h0 or h1. Let p0 and p1 denote the prior probabilities of hypotheses
h0 and h1, respectively, and without loss of generality, we assume 0 < p0 ≤ p1 < 1. In the
following, we use the notation ·|hj for ·|H = hj , j ∈ {0, 1}, to denote a random variable
under hypothesis hj . Under hypothesis h0 (resp. h1), the data Xi at time slot i is i.i.d. generated
according to pX|h0 (resp. pX|h1) where pX|h0 and pX|h1 are defined on the same finite alphabet
X and satisfy X ⊂ R, −∞ < minX < maxX <∞, and 0 < D(pX|h0||pX|h1) <∞.
At any time slot i, the MU follows a management policy γi to determine the (random)
adversarial observation Yi based on the data sequence xi, the previous adversarial observations
yi−1, and the true hypothesis h as Yi = γi(xi, yi−1, h), which can also be represented by the
corresponding conditional pmf pYi|Xi,Y i−1,H . Let Y denote the finite adversarial observation
alphabet at any time slot, which satisfies Y ⊂ R and −∞ < minY ≤ maxY < ∞. Let
γn , {γi}ni=1 : X n × H → Yn denote a management policy over an n-slot time horizon. The
following average distortion constraint is further imposed:
E
[
1
n
n∑
i=1
d(Xi, Yi)
∣∣∣∣∣hj
]
≤ s, j = 0, 1, (1)
where d(·, ·) : X ×Y → R+ is an additive distortion measure. A management policy that satisfies
(1) over an n-slot time horizon is denoted by γn(s). The distortion constraint may be imposed
either to guarantee a utility requirement from the data, or due to the availability of limited
resources to manipulate the data sequence {Xi}, e.g., smart meter privacy exploiting physical
energy sources [33].
We consider that an AD has access to the observations yn, and is fully informed about the prior
probabilities of the hypotheses, the original data statistics, as well as the adopted management
policy, i.e., the AD knows p0, p1, pXn|h0 , pXn|h1 , γ
n(s), and hence the resulting adversarial
observation statistics pY n|h0 , pY n|h1 . In this work, the informed AD is assumed to make an
optimal hypothesis test on the binary privacy hypothesis, and the privacy risk is measured by
the probability of error of this adversarial hypothesis test. In the following, we will study the
privacy leakage as a Neyman-Pearson hypothesis testing problem and a Bayesian hypothesis
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6testing problem. The corresponding optimal privacy performances will be characterized in the
asymptotic regime.
III. PRIVACY-PRESERVING DATA MANAGEMENT AGAINST A NEYMAN-PEARSON
HYPOTHESIS TESTING ADVERSARY
In this section, the privacy leakage is modeled as a Neyman-Pearson hypothesis test performed
by the informed AD. We assume that the AD has a maximum tolerance towards false positives,
imposed by a maximum type I probability of error, and its goal is to minimize the type II
probability of error under this constraint. Given a management policy γn(s) and the resulting
pY n|h0 , pY n|h1 , we define the minimal type II probability of error of the AD under an upper
bound on the type I probability of error as
β(n, ε, γn(s)) , min
An⊆Yn
{pY n|h1(An)|pY n|h0(Acn) ≤ ε},
where An and Acn denote the decision regions for h0 and h1 of the AD, respectively. On the
other hand, the privacy-preserving design objective of the MU is to maximize the probability of
error of the AD. More specifically, for a given constraint s on the average distortion that can be
introduced, the MU uses the optimal management policy to achieve the maximum minimal type
II probability of error subject to a type I probability of error constraint ε, which, with slight
abuse of notation, is denoted by β(n, ε, s) as
β(n, ε, s) , max
γn(s)
{β(n, ε, γn(s))}. (2)
Remark 1. Different from the game theoretic formulation in [27]–[29], we take a worst-case
analysis approach by assuming an informed AD who always performs the optimal hypothesis
test. This is more appropriate for the privacy problem studied here and will lead to a privacy
guarantee independent of the knowledge of the AD about the system.
In the following, the optimal privacy-preserving policy is characterized in the asymptotic
regime as n → ∞, by focusing on the asymptotic exponent of the maximum minimal type II
probability of error subject to a type I probability of error constraint.
We define the Kullback-Leibler divergence rate θ(s) as
θ(s) , inf
k,γk(s)
{
1
k
D(pY k|h0 ||pY k|h1)
}
, (3)
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7where the infimum is taken over all k ∈ Z+, and for each k, over all management policies that
satisfy the average distortion constraint over a k-slot time horizon.
Lemma 1.
θ(s) = lim
k→∞
inf
γk(s)
{
1
k
D(pY k|h0||pY k|h1)
}
.
Proof: We first show that the following sequence
{
infγk(s)
{
D(pY k|h0||pY k|h1)
}}
k∈Z+ is
subadditive. Given any n, l ∈ Z+, let (γn(s), γl(s)) denote a management policy, which uses
γn(s) over the first n slots, and γl(s) over the remaining l slots. Therefore, (γn(s), γl(s)) satisfies
the average distortion constraint over an (n+ l)-slot time horizon. We have
inf
γn+l(s)
{
D(pY n+l|h0||pY n+l|h1)
}
≤ inf
(γn(s),γl(s))
{
D(pY n+l|h0 ||pY n+l|h1)
}
= inf
γn(s)
{
D(pY n|h0||pY n|h1)
}
+ inf
γl(s)
{
D(pY l|h0||pY l|h1)
}
,
where the equality follows from the chain rule for the Kullback-Leibler divergence. Then, it
follows from Fekete’s Lemma [35, Lemma 11.2] that
θ(s) = inf
k,γk(s)
{
1
k
D(pY k|h0||pY k|h1)
}
= lim
k→∞
inf
γk(s)
{
1
k
D(pY k|h0||pY k|h1)
}
.
The following theorem characterizes the operational meaning of the Kullback-Leibler diver-
gence rate θ(s) in the asymptotic assessment of the optimal privacy performance assuming an
adversarial Neyman-Pearson hypothesis test.
Theorem 1. Given s > 0,
lim sup
n→∞
1
n
log
1
β(n, ε, s)
≤ θ(s), ∀ε ∈ (0, 1), (4)
and
lim
ε→1
lim inf
n→∞
1
n
log
1
β(n, ε, s)
≥ θ(s). (5)
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8Proof: Given any k ∈ Z+, γk(s), and the resulting pY k|h0 , pY k|h1 , let γkl(s) denote a
management policy which repeatedly uses γk(s) for l times. From the definition in (2) and
Stein’s Lemma [36, Theorem 11.8.3], it follows that
lim sup
l→∞
1
kl
log
1
β(kl, ε, s)
≤ lim
l→∞
1
kl
log
1
β(kl, ε, γkl(s))
=
1
k
D(pY k|h0||pY k|h1),
for all ε ∈ (0, 1). For k(l − 1) < n ≤ kl, we have
β(kl, ε, s) ≤ β(n, ε, s) ≤ β(k(l − 1), ε, s).
It follows that
lim sup
n→∞
1
n
log
1
β(n, ε, s)
≤ lim sup
l→∞
kl
k(l − 1)
1
kl
log
1
β(kl, ε, s)
= lim sup
l→∞
1
kl
log
1
β(kl, ε, s)
≤ 1
k
D(pY k|h0||pY k|h1),
for all ε ∈ (0, 1), k ∈ Z+, and γk(s). Therefore, we have the upper bound
lim sup
n→∞
1
n
log
1
β(n, ε, s)
≤ θ(s), ∀ε ∈ (0, 1).
Given 0 < δ′ <∞ and for all n ∈ Z+, let ε′(n) ,
sup
γn(s)
pY n|h0
{
yn
∣∣∣∣log pY n|h0(yn)pY n|h1(yn) < D(pY n|h0||pY n|h1)− δ′
}
,
and let (n) ,
sup
γn(s)
pY n|h0
{
yn
∣∣∣∣log pY n|h0(yn)pY n|h1(yn) ≤ D(pY n|h0||pY n|h1)− δ′
}
.
Note that ε′(n) ≤ (n). We further have (n) < 1 since (n) = 1 will lead to the contradiction
D(pY n|h0||pY n|h1) ≤ D(pY n|h0||pY n|h1)− δ′. It follows that ε′(n) < 1. Suppose that γn∗(s) leads
to p∗Y n|h0 , p
∗
Y n|h1 , and achieves β(n, ε
′(n), s). If the AD uses the following hypothesis testing
strategy
An =
{
yn
∣∣∣∣∣ 1n log p
∗
Y n|h0(y
n)
p∗Y n|h1(y
n)
≥ t(n)
}
, (6)
with the test threshold
t(n) =
1
n
D(p∗Y n|h0||p∗Y n|h1)−
δ′
n
, (7)
March 12, 2019 DRAFT
9from the definition of ε′(n), the corresponding type I probability of error satisfies the upper
bound constraint
p∗Y n|h0(Acn) ≤ ε′(n).
Since the hypothesis testing strategy in (6) is not necessarily optimal for the AD, the definition
of the maximum minimal type II probability of error implies that
β(n, ε′(n), s) ≤ p∗Y n|h1(An). (8)
In [37, Lemma 4.1.1], it has been shown that
p∗Y n|h1(An) ≤ exp(−nt(n)). (9)
The inequalities (8) and (9) jointly lead to
β(n, ε′(n), s) ≤ exp(−nt(n))
≤ exp
(
−n
(
inf
γn(s)
{
1
n
D(pY n|h0||pY n|h1)
}
− δ
′
n
))
,
i.e., for all n ∈ Z+,
1
n
log
1
β(n, ε′(n), s)
≥ inf
γn(s)
{
1
n
D(pY n|h0||pY n|h1)
}
− δ
′
n
.
In the asymptotic regime as n→∞, it follows that
lim inf
n→∞
1
n
log
1
β(n, ε′(n), s)
≥ lim
n→∞
inf
γn(s)
{
1
n
D(pY n|h0||pY n|h1)
}
− lim
n→∞
δ′
n
= θ(s),
where the equality follows from Lemma 1. Note that lim infn→∞ 1n log
1
β(n,ε,s)
is a monotone
non-decreasing function of ε. Then the lower bound holds:
lim
ε→1
lim inf
n→∞
1
n
log
1
β(n, ε, s)
≥ lim inf
n→∞
1
n
log
1
β(n, ε′(n), s)
≥θ(s).
(10)
When ε is close to one, the bounds on the asymptotic exponent of the maximum minimal
type II probability of error are tight, which is made more concrete in the following corollary.
Corollary 1. Given s > 0,
lim
ε→1
lim
n→∞
1
n
log
1
β(n, ε, s)
= θ(s).
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Remark 2. Given s > 0, the case ε→ 1 represents the worst privacy leakage scenario assuming
the adversarial Neyman-Pearson hypothesis test, i.e., θ(s) is a privacy guarantee.
In the following, we characterize the asymptotic privacy performances of two particular
management policies in the worst case scenario, i.e., ε→ 1.
A. Memoryless Hypothesis-Aware Policy
A simple MU might have a limited processing capability, and at time slot i, applies a
memoryless hypothesis-aware management policy pii, which can be time-variant, to determine
the random adversarial observation Yi based on the current data xi and the true hypothesis h
as Yi = pii(xi, h). Let pin , {pii}ni=1 : X n × H → Yn denote a memoryless hypothesis-aware
management policy over an n-slot time horizon. If pin satisfies the average distortion constraint
in (1), it is denoted by pin(s). When the MU adopts the optimal memoryless hypothesis-aware
policy, the maximum minimal type II probability of error subject to a type I probability of error
upper bound ε is denoted by
βL(n, ε, s) , max
pin(s)
{β(n, ε, pin(s))}. (11)
We similarly define θL(s) as
θL(s) , inf
k,pik(s)
{
1
k
D(pY k|h0||pY k|h1)
}
. (12)
Following similar proof steps as in Theorem 1, we can specify the asymptotic exponent of the
maximum minimal type II probability of error by the Kullback-Leibler divergence rate θL(s)
when the MU adopts the optimal memoryless hypothesis-aware policy.
Corollary 2. Given s > 0,
lim
ε→1
lim
n→∞
1
n
log
1
βL(n, ε, s)
= θL(s). (13)
We next show that the asymptotic exponent of the maximum minimal type II probability of
error can also be characterized by a single-letter Kullback-Leibler divergence. To this end, we
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first define the following single-letter Kullback-Leibler divergence function of single-slot average
distortion constraints under both hypotheses.
Given s¯, s˜ > 0, we define φ(s¯, s˜) as
φ(s¯, s˜) , min
(pY |X,h0 ,pY |X,h1 )∈P(s¯,s˜)
{
D(pY |h0||pY |h1)
}
, (14)
where the minimization is over the convex domain
P(s¯, s˜) ,
(pY |X,h0 , pY |X,h1)
∣∣∣∣∣∣
E[d(X, Y )|h0] ≤ s¯
E[d(X, Y )|h1] ≤ s˜
 .
In the definition of P(s¯, s˜), E[d(X, Y )|h0] ≤ s¯ denotes the single-slot average distortion con-
straint under hypothesis h0; and E[d(X, Y )|h1] ≤ s˜ denotes the single-slot average distortion
constraint under hypothesis h1.
Lemma 2. φ(s¯, s˜) is a non-increasing, continuous, and jointly convex function for s¯ > 0 and
s˜ > 0.
Proof: The non-increasing property of φ(s¯, s˜) is self-evident. On the two-dimensional convex
open set of s¯ > 0, s˜ > 0, its continuity will follow from the convexity [38]. Therefore, we only
prove its convexity here. Assume that (p(1)Y |X,h0 , p
(1)
Y |X,h1) leads to φ(s¯1, s˜1) = D(p
(1)
Y |h0||p
(1)
Y |h1) and
(p
(2)
Y |X,h0 , p
(2)
Y |X,h1) leads to φ(s¯2, s˜2) = D(p
(2)
Y |h0||p
(2)
Y |h1). For all 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1,
λφ(s¯1, s˜1) + (1− λ)φ(s¯2, s˜2)
=λD(p(1)Y |h0||p
(1)
Y |h1) + (1− λ)D(p
(2)
Y |h0||p
(2)
Y |h1)
≥D(λp(1)Y |h0 + (1− λ)p
(2)
Y |h0 ||λp
(1)
Y |h1 + (1− λ)p
(2)
Y |h1)
≥φ(λs¯1 + (1− λ)s¯2, λs˜1 + (1− λ)s˜2),
where the first inequality follows from the convexity of D(·||·); and the second follows from the
definition of φ(s¯, s˜) in (14).
Theorem 2. Given s > 0,
θL(s) = φ(s, s). (15)
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Proof: For any k ∈ Z+, pik(s), and the resulting pY k|h0 , pY k|h1 , we have
1
k
D
(
pY k|h0||pY k|h1
)
(a)
=
1
k
k∑
i=1
D
(
pYi|h0||pYi|h1
)
(b)
≥ 1
k
k∑
i=1
φ (E[d(Xi, Yi)|h0],E[d(Xi, Yi)|h1])
(c)
≥φ
(
E
[
1
k
k∑
i=1
d(Xi, Yi)
∣∣∣∣∣h0
]
,E
[
1
k
k∑
i=1
d(Xi, Yi)
∣∣∣∣∣h1
])
(d)
≥φ(s, s),
where (a) follows since the policy pik(s) leads to pY k|hj =
∏k
i=1 pYi|hj for j = 0, 1; (b) follows
from the definition of φ(s¯, s˜); (c) and (d) follow from the convexity and the non-increasing
property of φ(s¯, s˜), respectively.
Therefore, we have
θL(s) = inf
k,pik(s)
{
1
k
D(pY k|h0||pY k|h1)
}
≥ φ(s, s). (16)
The proof of the opposite direction is straightforward. Let (p∗Y |X,h0 , p
∗
Y |X,h1) be the optimizer
which achieves φ(s, s). It can be seen as a single-slot memoryless hypothesis-aware policy pi1(s).
From the definition of θL(s) in (12), it follows that
θL(s) ≤ φ(s, s). (17)
Alternatively, the inequality (17) follows since φ(s, s) is the asymptotic exponent of the minimal
type II probability of error achieved by a memoryless hypothesis-aware policy by using the
single-slot policy (p∗Y |X,h0 , p
∗
Y |X,h1) at all slots.
The inequalities (16) and (17) jointly lead to Theorem 2.
Remark 3. Given s > 0, the asymptotic exponent of the maximum minimal type II probability of
error, limε→1 limn→∞ 1n log
1
βL(n,ε,s)
, can be achieved by a memoryless hypothesis-aware policy
which uses the single-slot policy (p∗Y |X,h0 , p
∗
Y |X,h1) corresponding to the optimizer of φ(s, s) at
all time slots.
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B. Hypothesis-Unaware Policy with Memory
We now consider an MU which does not have access to the true hypothesis but has a
large memory storage and a powerful processing capability. At time slot i, the MU follows
a hypothesis-unaware management policy with memory, denoted by ρi, to determine the random
adversarial observation Yi based on the data sequence xi and the past adversarial observations
yi−1 as Yi = ρi(xi, yi−1). Let ρn , {ρi}ni=1 : X n → Yn denote a hypothesis-unaware management
policy with memory over an n-slot time horizon. If ρn satisfies the average distortion constraint
in (1), it is denoted by ρn(s). When the MU uses the optimal privacy-preserving hypothesis-
unaware policy with memory, the achieved maximum minimal type II probability of error subject
to a type I probability of error upper bound ε is denoted by
βM(n, ε, s) , max
ρn(s)
{β(n, ε, ρn(s))}. (18)
Similarly, we define a Kullback-Leibler divergence rate θM(s) as
θM(s) , inf
k,ρk(s)
{
1
k
D(pY k|h0||pY k|h1)
}
. (19)
As specified in the following corollary, the asymptotic exponent of the maximum minimal type
II probability of error can be characterized by the Kullback-Leibler divergence rate θM(s) when
the MU uses the optimal privacy-preserving hypothesis-unaware policy with memory.
Corollary 3. Given s > 0,
lim
ε→1
lim
n→∞
1
n
log
1
βM(n, ε, s)
= θM(s). (20)
Compared with the memoryless hypothesis-aware policy, the hypothesis-unaware policy with
memory has all the past data and adversarial observations while it does not know the true
hypothesis. We next compare the asymptotic privacy performances of the two policies.
Theorem 3. Given s > 0,
θM(s) ≤ θL(s) = φ(s, s). (21)
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To prove Theorem 3, we will construct a two-phase hypothesis-unaware policy with memory,
which first learns the hypothesis, and then we bound its privacy performance by θM(s) and
φ(s, s). The complete proof is given in the appendix.
Remark 4. The optimal privacy-preserving memoryless hypothesis-aware policy cannot outper-
form the optimal privacy-preserving hypothesis-unaware policy with memory. This is because
the MU can learn the hypothesis with an arbitrarily small probability of error after observing
a sufficiently long sequence of the original data.
IV. PRIVACY-PRESERVING DATA MANAGEMENT AGAINST A BAYESIAN HYPOTHESIS
TESTING ADVERSARY
In this section, we consider an adversarial Bayesian hypothesis testing formulation for the
privacy problem. A particular Bayesian risk used here is the error probability of the AD. Thus,
the minimal error probability of the AD measures the privacy leakage. The asymptotic privacy
performance is studied under the adversarial Bayesian hypothesis testing framework.
The informed AD is assumed to use the optimal hypothesis testing strategy to achieve the
minimal error probability as
α(n, γn(s)) , min
An⊆Yn
{
p0 · pY n|h0(Acn) + p1 · pY n|h1(An)
}
,
where p0, p1 denote the prior probabilities of hypotheses h0, h1; and An, Acn denote the decision
regions for h0, h1 of the AD. Correspondingly, the MU uses the optimal management policy
that maximizes the minimal error probability of the AD as
α(n, s) , max
γn(s)
{α(n, γn(s))} . (22)
We will characterize the optimal privacy performance in the asymptotic regime as n→∞ by
focusing on the asymptotic exponent of the maximum minimal error probability. To this end, we
first introduce the Chernoff information. The Chernoff information of a probability distribution
P (Z) from another distribution Q(Z) is defined as
C(P (Z), Q(Z)) , max
0≤τ≤1
{Cτ (P (Z), Q(Z))} ,
where
Cτ (P (Z), Q(Z)) , − log
(∑
z∈Z
P τ (z)Q1−τ (z)
)
.
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The convexity of Chernoff information is shown in the following propositions.
Proposition 1. Given 0 ≤ τ ≤ 1, the function Cτ (P (Z), Q(Z)) is jointly convex in P (Z) and
Q(Z).
Proof: Given 0 ≤ τ < 1, the function Cτ (P (Z), Q(Z)) is related to the Re´nyi divergence
Dτ (P (Z)||Q(Z)) as
Cτ (P (Z), Q(Z)) = (1− τ) · Dτ (P (Z)||Q(Z)).
The convexity of Cτ (P (Z), Q(Z)) follows from the convexity of Re´nyi divergence [39, Theorem
11] since 1− τ is a positive scalar.
If τ = 1, we have
C1(P (Z), Q(Z)) =− log (P ({z ∈ Z|Q(z) > 0}))
=D0(Q(Z)||P (Z)).
In this case, the convexity of C1(P (Z), Q(Z)) follows from the convexity of D0(Q(Z)||P (Z)).
Proposition 2. The Chernoff information C(P (Z), Q(Z)) is jointly convex in P (Z) and Q(Z).
The convexity of C(P (Z), Q(Z)) follows from the convexity of Cτ (P (Z), Q(Z)) for all 0 ≤
τ ≤ 1 and the fact that pointwise maximum preserves convexity [40, Section 3.2.3].
We define the Chernoff information rate µ(s) as follows:
µ(s) , inf
k,γk(s)
{
1
k
C(pY k|h0 , pY k|h1)
}
. (23)
The following lemma shows that the infimum over k ∈ Z+ in the definition of the Chernoff
information rate µ(s) is taken at the limit.
Lemma 3.
µ(s) = lim
k→∞
inf
γk(s)
{
1
k
C(pY k|h0 , pY k|h1)
}
.
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Proof: Given any n, l ∈ Z+, as defined before, (γn(s), γl(s)) is a management policy
satisfying the average distortion constraint over an (n+ l)-slot time horizon. We have
inf
γn+l(s)
{
C(pY n+l|h0 , pY n+l|h1)
}
≤ inf
(γn(s),γl(s))
{
C(pY n+l|h0 , pY n+l|h1)
}
(a)
= inf
(γn(s),γl(s))
{max
0≤τ≤1
{Cτ (pY n|h0 , pY n|h1)
+ Cτ (pY l|h0 , pY l|h1)}}
≤ inf
(γn(s),γl(s))
{max
0≤κ≤1
{Cκ(pY n|h0 , pY n|h1)}
+ max
0≤σ≤1
{Cσ(pY l|h0 , pY l|h1)}}
= inf
γn(s)
{
C(pY n|h0 , pY n|h1)
}
+ inf
γl(s)
{
C(pY l|h0 , pY l|h1)
}
,
where (a) follows from the independence property pY n+l|hj = pY n|hj ·pY l|hj , j = 0, 1, satisfied by
the management policy (γn(s), γl(s)). Therefore, the sequence
{
infγk(s)
{
C(pY k|h0 , pY k|h1)
}}
k∈Z+
is subadditive. Then, Lemma 3 follows from Fekete’s Lemma.
Next, we show that the asymptotic exponent of the maximum minimal error probability is
characterized by the Chernoff information rate µ(s).
Theorem 4. Given s > 0,
lim
n→∞
1
n
log
1
α(n, s)
= µ(s). (24)
Proof: Given any k ∈ Z+, γk(s), and the resulting pY k|h0 , pY k|h1 , as defined before, γkl(s) is
a management policy which repeatedly uses γk(s) for l times and satisfies the average distortion
constraint over a kl-slot time horizon. From the optimality in the definition (22) and the theorem
[36, Theorem 11.9.1], it follows that
lim sup
l→∞
1
kl
log
1
α(kl, s)
≤ lim
l→∞
1
kl
log
1
α(kl, γkl(s))
=
1
k
C(pY k|h0 , pY k|h1).
For k(l − 1) < n ≤ kl, we have
α(kl, s) ≤ α(n, s) ≤ α(k(l − 1), s).
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It follows that
lim sup
n→∞
1
n
log
1
α(n, s)
≤ lim sup
l→∞
kl
k(l − 1)
1
kl
log
1
α(kl, s)
= lim sup
l→∞
1
kl
log
1
α(kl, s)
≤ 1
k
C(pY k|h0 , pY k|h1),
for all k ∈ Z+ and γk(s). Therefore, we have the upper bound
lim sup
n→∞
1
n
log
1
α(n, s)
≤ µ(s). (25)
Given any n ∈ Z+, suppose that γn∗(s) leads to p∗Y n|h0 , p∗Y n|h1 , and achieves α(n, s). An optimal
hypothesis testing strategy of the AD is a deterministic likelihood-ratio test [41] given by
A∗n =
{
yn
∣∣∣∣∣p
∗
Y n|h0(y
n)
p∗Y n|h1(y
n)
≥ p1
p0
}
.
Based on the optimal strategy of the AD, we can then rewrite the maximum minimal error
probability α(n, s), and derive upper bounds on it as follows. For all 0 ≤ τ ≤ 1,
α(n, s) =
∑
Yn
min
{
p0 · p∗Y n|h0(yn), p1 · p∗Y n|h1(yn)
}
(a)
≤
∑
Yn
pτ0 · p∗τY n|h0(yn) · p1−τ1 · p∗1−τY n|h1(yn)
≤
∑
Yn
p∗τY n|h0(y
n)p∗1−τY n|h1(y
n),
where the inequality (a) follows from [36, (11.244)]. Therefore, we have
1
n
log
1
α(n, s)
≥ 1
n
max
0≤τ≤1
{
− log
(∑
Yn
p∗τY n|h0(y
n)p∗1−τY n|h1(y
n)
)}
=
1
n
C(p∗Y n|h0 , p
∗
Y n|h1)
≥ inf
γn(s)
{
1
n
C(pY n|h0 , pY n|h1)
}
.
In the asymptotic regime, as n→∞, we have
lim inf
n→∞
1
n
log
1
α(n, s)
≥ lim
n→∞
inf
γn(s)
{
1
n
C(pY n|h0 , pY n|h1)
}
=µ(s),
(26)
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where the final equality follows from Lemma 3.
The inequalities (25) and (26) jointly lead to Theorem 4.
Remark 5. Over a finite time horizon, the prior distribution of the hypothesis determines the
test threshold of the optimal likelihood-ratio test of the AD, and further determines the exponent
of the maximum minimal error probability. However, as shown in Theorem 4, the asymptotic
exponent of the maximum minimal error probability does not depend on the prior distribution.
In the following, we characterize the privacy-preserving managements for the two particular
cases, the memoryless hypothesis-aware policy and the hypothesis-unaware policy with memory,
under the adversarial Bayesian hypothesis testing framework.
A. Memoryless Hypothesis-Aware Policy
When the MU uses the optimal memoryless hypothesis-aware policy pin∗(s) against the ad-
versarial Bayesian hypothesis test, the achieved maximum minimal error probability is denoted
by
αL(n, s) , max
pin(s)
{α(n, pin(s))}. (27)
We similarly define µL(s) as
µL(s) , inf
k,pik(s)
{
1
k
C(pY k|h0 , pY k|h1)
}
. (28)
Following similar proof steps as in Theorem 4, we can show that the asymptotic exponent of the
maximum minimal error probability is specified by the Chernoff information rate µL(s) when
the MU uses the optimal privacy-preserving memoryless hypothesis-aware policy.
Corollary 4. Given s > 0,
lim
n→∞
1
n
log
1
αL(n, s)
= µL(s). (29)
We next define two single-letter expressions, which characterize upper and lower bounds on the
asymptotic exponent of the maximum minimal error probability. Given s¯, s˜ > 0 and 0 ≤ τ ≤ 1,
we define
ντ (s¯, s˜) , min
(pY |X,h0 ,pY |X,h1 )∈P(s¯,s˜)
{
Cτ (pY |h0 , pY |h1)
}
, (30)
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and define the single-letter Chernoff information as
ν(s¯, s˜) , min
(pY |X,h0 ,pY |X,h1 )∈P(s¯,s˜)
{
C(pY |h0 , pY |h1)
}
. (31)
Lemma 4. Given 0 ≤ τ ≤ 1, ντ (s¯, s˜) is a non-increasing and jointly convex function for s¯ > 0
and s˜ > 0.
Lemma 5. ν(s¯, s˜) is a non-increasing, continuous, and jointly convex function for s¯ > 0 and
s˜ > 0.
The proofs of Lemmas 4 and 5 follow from the same arguments as in the proof of Lemma
2, and are therefore omitted.
Lemma 6. Given s > 0, we have
max
0≤τ≤1
{ντ (s, s)} ≤ µL(s) ≤ ν(s, s). (32)
Proof: Given any 0 ≤ τ ≤ 1, k ∈ Z+, memoryless hypothesis-aware policy pik(s), and the
resulting pY k|h0 , pY k|h1 , we have
1
k
C(pY k|h0 , pY k|h1)
=
1
k
max
0≤κ≤1
{
Cκ
(
pY k|h0 , pY k|h1
)}
≥1
k
Cτ
(
pY k|h0 , pY k|h1
)
(a)
=
1
k
k∑
i=1
Cτ
(
pYi|h0 , pYi|h1
)
(b)
≥ 1
k
k∑
i=1
ντ (E[d(Xi, Yi)|h0],E[d(Xi, Yi)|h1])
(c)
≥ντ
(
E
[
1
k
k∑
i=1
d(Xi, Yi)
∣∣∣∣∣h0
]
,E
[
1
k
k∑
i=1
d(Xi, Yi)
∣∣∣∣∣h1
])
(d)
≥ντ (s, s),
(33)
where (a) follows since the policy pik(s) leads to pY k|hj =
∏k
i=1 pYi|hj for j = 0, 1; (b) follows
from the definition of ντ (s¯, s˜); (c) follows from the convexity of ντ (s¯, s˜); and finally (d) follows
from the non-increasing property of ντ (s¯, s˜).
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For any k ∈ Z+, pik(s), and the resulting pY k|h0 , pY k|h1 , we have
1
k
C(pY k|h0 , pY k|h1) ≥ max0≤τ≤1 {ντ (s, s)} ,
since the inequality (33) holds for all 0 ≤ τ ≤ 1. It further follows that
µL(s) = inf
k,pik(s)
{
1
k
C(pY k|h0 , pY k|h1)
}
≥ max
0≤τ≤1
{ντ (s, s)} .
The other inequality µL(s) ≤ ν(s, s) in (32) follows from the definitions of µL(s) and ν(s, s).
Under the adversarial Bayesian hypothesis test setting, we have obtained a max min single-
letter lower bound and a min max single-letter upper bound on the asymptotic exponent of the
maximum minimal error probability when we focus on memoryless hypothesis-aware policy.
In the following theorem, we show that the two bounds match each other, and the asymptotic
exponent of the maximum minimal error probability can be specified by the single-letter Chernoff
information ν(s, s).
Theorem 5. Given s > 0,
µL(s) = ν(s, s). (34)
Proof: Given s > 0, the lower and upper bounds derived in Lemma 6 can be specified by
a max min expression and a min max expression as follows:
max
0≤τ≤1
{ντ (s, s)}
= max
0≤τ≤1
{
min
(pY |X,h0 ,pY |X,h1 )∈P(s,s)
{
Cτ (pY |h0 , pY |h1)
}}
,
ν(s, s)
= min
(pY |X,h0 ,pY |X,h1 )∈P(s,s)
{
max
0≤τ≤1
{
Cτ (pY |h0 , pY |h1)
}}
.
If τ is fixed, Cτ (pY |h0 , pY |h1) is a jointly convex function in pY |X,h0 and pY |X,h1 , which follows
from the convexity of Cτ (·, ·) shown in Proposition 1 and the convexity-preserving composition
rule in [40, Section 3.2.4]. If pY |X,h0 and pY |X,h1 are fixed, pY |h0 and pY |h1 are fixed, and
Cτ (pY |h0 , pY |h1) is a concave function in τ , which follows from the result [39, Corollary 2].
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From von Neumann’s Minimax Theorem [42], it follows that
max
0≤τ≤1
{ντ (s, s)} = ν(s, s). (35)
Lemma 6 and (35) jointly lead to Theorem 5.
Remark 6. Given s > 0, the asymptotic exponent of the maximum minimal error probability,
limn→∞ 1n log
1
αL(n,s)
, can be achieved by a memoryless hypothesis-aware policy which uses the
single-slot policy (p∗Y |X,h0 , p
∗
Y |X,h1) corresponding to the optimizer of ν(s, s) at all time slots.
B. Hypothesis-Unaware Policy with Memory
When the MU uses the optimal hypothesis-unaware policy with memory, the achieved maxi-
mum minimal error probability is denoted by
αM(n, s) , max
ρn(s)
{α(n, ρn(s))} . (36)
We define the Chernoff information rate µM(s) as
µM(s) , inf
k,ρk(s)
{
1
k
C
(
pY k|h0 , pY k|h1
)}
, (37)
which characterizes the asymptotic exponent of the maximum minimal error probability as shown
in the following corollary.
Corollary 5. Given s > 0,
lim
n→∞
1
n
log
1
αM(n, s)
= µM(s). (38)
Similar to the adversarial Neyman-Pearson hypothesis testing case, the following theorem
shows that the optimal memoryless hypothesis-aware policy cannot outperform the optimal
hypothesis-unaware policy with memory against the adversarial Bayesian hypothesis test.
Theorem 6. Given s > 0,
µM(s) ≤ µL(s) = ν(s, s). (39)
The proof of Theorem 6 follows similarly to Theorem 3. We can construct a two-phase
hypothesis-unaware policy with memory, which first learns the hypothesis. Then, we bound its
privacy performance with µM(s) and ν(s, s). The complete proof is given in the appendix.
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Yih0/h1
Xi-Yi
RES
h0/h1
Fig. 2. The smart meter privacy problem in the presence of a renewable energy source (RES).
V. APPLICATION TO SMART METER PRIVACY PROBLEM
In this section, we consider an application of the theoretical framework we have introduced
above to the smart meter privacy problem.
A. Smart Meter Privacy Model
The considered smart meter privacy problem is shown in Fig. 2. The i.i.d. data Xi denotes the
non-negative energy demand at time slot i, from a finite energy demand alphabet X . The binary
hypothesis represents the private user behavior, e.g., the user is at home or not, or a particular
appliance is being used or not. Assuming that the EP is an AD, the adversarial observation Yi
corresponds in this setting to the non-negative meter reading, or equivalently the energy supply
from the EP, at time slot i. The finite energy supply alphabet satisfies Y ⊇ X .
The energy management unit (EMU) is a processor run by the user that manages the energy
supplies to satisfy the energy demand. At every time slot, the EMU follows an instantaneous
energy management policy to determine Yi. It is assumed that the rest of the energy demand, Xi−
Yi, is satisfied from the renewable energy source (RES). We impose the following instantaneous
constraint:
pYi|Xi(yi|xi) = 0, if yi > xi, (40)
i.e., the RES cannot be charged with energy from the EP. We assume that the RES has a
positive average energy generation rate s and is equipped with a sufficiently large energy storage.
Accordingly, the following average energy constraint is imposed on the energy management
policy over an n-slot time horizon for the long-term availability of renewable energy supply:
E
[
1
n
n∑
i=1
(Xi − Yi)
∣∣∣∣∣hj
]
≤ s, j = 0, 1. (41)
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The assumptions on the informed AD and the adversarial hypothesis test are the same as the
general problem. Here the EP is considered as an AD, who has the authority to access the meter
readings of energy supplies from the EP, and has all the statistical knowledge, but does not have
access to the amount of energy supply from the RES, which is available locally to the user.
The privacy-preserving energy management is to modify the energy demand sequence {Xi}
into an energy supply sequence {Yi} by exploiting the RES in an online manner to prevent the
EP from correctly inferring the user behavior.
B. Privacy-Preserving Energy Management
Note that an energy management policy satisfying (40) and (41) will satisfy the constraint (1) in
the general problem. Therefore, the obtained theoretic results of asymptotic privacy performance
in the general problem can be directly applied to the smart meter privacy problem. Here, we
will focus on the memoryless hypothesis-aware energy management policy, which can be easily
designed and implemented.
Under the adversarial Neyman-Pearson hypothesis test, and given a renewable energy gener-
ation rate s > 0, it follows from Corollary 2 and Theorem 2 that the exponent of the maximum
minimal type II probability of error can be characterized by
φ(s, s) = min
(pY |X,h0 ,pY |X,h1 )∈PE(s,s)
{
D(pY |h0||pY |h1)
}
, (42)
with the convex set
PE(s, s)
,

(pY |X,h0 , pY |X,h1)
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
E[X − Y |h0] ≤ s
E[X − Y |h1] ≤ s
pY |X,h0(y|x) = 0, if y > x
pY |X,h1(y|x) = 0, if y > x

.
While solving the optimization problem in (42) leads to the optimal privacy performance, the
energy supply alphabet Y can be very large, which means a highly complex optimization problem.
On the other hand, the energy demand alphabet X is determined by a number of operation modes
of the appliances and is typically finite. We show in the next theorem that the alphabet Y can
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be limited to the alphabet X . This result can greatly simplify the numerical evaluation of φ(s, s)
in the considered smart meter privacy context.
Theorem 7. The energy supply alphabet can be limited to the energy demand alphabet under
both hypotheses without loss of optimality for the evaluation of φ(s, s).
Proof: Suppose that φ(s, s) = D(p∗Y |h0||p∗Y |h1) is achieved by p∗Y |X,h0 and p∗Y |X,h1 . Let X =
{x(1), . . . , x(|X |)} with x(i) < x(k) if i < k. Consider the following quantization operation which
maps y to yˆ:
yˆ =
 x(i), if y ∈ (x(i−1), x(i)], i ≥ 2
x(1), if y ∈ [0, x(1)]
.
It can be verified that pYˆ |X,h0 , pYˆ |X,h1 satisfy the constraints in the definition of PE(s, s). From
the optimality in the definition of φ(s, s), we have
φ(s, s) = D(p∗Y |h0||p∗Y |h1) ≤ D(pYˆ |h0||pYˆ |h1).
In addition, due to the data processing inequality of Kullback-Leibler divergence [39, Theorem
9], we have
φ(s, s) = D(p∗Y |h0||p∗Y |h1) ≥ D(pYˆ |h0||pYˆ |h1).
Therefore,
φ(s, s) = D(pYˆ |h0 ||pYˆ |h1),
and the energy supply alphabet under both hypotheses can be constrained to X without loss of
optimality.
Under the adversarial Bayesian hypothesis test, and given a renewable energy generation rate
s > 0, it follows from Corollary 4 and Theorem 5 that the exponent of the maximum minimal
error probability can be characterized by
ν(s, s) = min
(pY |X,h0 ,pY |X,h1 )∈PE(s,s)
{
C(pY |h0 , pY |h1)
}
. (43)
Similarly, the following theorem shows that the supply alphabet Y can be limited to the demand
alphabet X without loss of optimality for the numerical evaluation of ν(s, s) in the considered
smart meter privacy context.
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Theorem 8. The energy supply alphabet can be limited to the energy demand alphabet under
both hypotheses without loss of optimality for the evaluation of ν(s, s).
Proof: Suppose that ν(s, s) = C(p∗Y |h0 , p
∗
Y |h1) is achieved by p
∗
Y |X,h0 and p
∗
Y |X,h1 . We use
the same quantization operation in the proof of Theorem 7 to map y to yˆ. Therefore, pYˆ |X,h0 and
pYˆ |X,h1 satisfy the constraints in the definition of PE(s, s). From the optimality in the definition
of ν(s, s), it follows that
ν(s, s) = C(p∗Y |h0 , p
∗
Y |h1) ≤ C(pYˆ |h0 , pYˆ |h1).
In addition, from the data processing inequality of Re´nyi divergence [39, Theorem 9], we have
C(p∗Y |h0 , p
∗
Y |h1)
= max
0≤τ≤1
{
Cτ (p∗Y |h0 , p
∗
Y |h1)
}
= max{max
0≤τ<1
{(1− τ)Dτ (p∗Y |h0||p∗Y |h1)},D0(p∗Y |h1||p∗Y |h0)}
≥max{max
0≤τ<1
{(1− τ)Dτ (pYˆ |h0||pYˆ |h1)},D0(pYˆ |h1||pYˆ |h0)}
= max
0≤τ≤1
{
Cτ (pYˆ |h0 , pYˆ |h1)
}
=C(pYˆ |h0 , pYˆ |h1).
Therefore,
ν(s, s) = C(pYˆ |h0 , pYˆ |h1),
and the energy supply alphabet under both hypotheses can be constrained to X without loss of
optimality.
We also highlight here the connections and differences of our result with other smart meter
privacy literature. While Kullback-Leibler divergence can be considered as yet another statistical
similarity measure, our formulation here provides an operational meaning to its use as the privacy
measure. This is in contrast to some of the other privacy measures considered in the literature,
such as the mutual information used in [7], [31], [32], which are mainly proposed as distances
between the energy demand data and the smart meter reading. A related work is [13] in the
context of smart meter privacy, which uses the Fisher information as a privacy measure. The
Fisher information is an approximation of the Kullback-Leibler divergence between two similar
probability distributions [43]; therefore, the two privacy measures are closely related. But the
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Fig. 3. Asymptotic privacy performance φ(s, s) for a binary demand model with different values of p¯ and p˜.
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Fig. 4. Asymptotic privacy performance ν(s, s) for a binary demand model with different values of p¯ and p˜.
authors in [13] focus on a parameter estimation problem, rather than a classification problem in
our work, and exploit an energy storage device to provide privacy. It is difficult to compare our
result with [7], [13], [31], [32] because of their different problem settings, e.g., there is only
one energy demand profile in [7], [13], [31], [32] while there are two energy demand profiles
in our work. The connection between differential privacy and the minimum mutual information
leakage problem has been revealed in [44]. The differential privacy model in [9], [10] considers
the aggregation of meter readings rather than a sequence of meter readings in our work; and
furthermore, the constraint of non-negative renewable energy supply in our work cannot provide
the Laplace noise often used in the differential privacy model.
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C. Binary Demand Example
We first present a simple example with binary energy demand alphabet1 X = {0, 2} for the
purpose to numerically illustrate the main results in this paper. Based on Theorem 7 and Theorem
8, it is sufficient to consider a binary supply alphabet Y = {0, 2}, as well. Denote pX|h0(0) by
p¯ and pX|h1(0) by p˜.
Under the adversarial Neyman-Pearson test setting and using the optimal memoryless hypothesis-
aware policy, the asymptotic privacy performance φ(s, s) is shown in Fig. 3 for different values
of p¯ and p˜. Confirming the claim in Lemma 2, it can be observed that φ(s, s) is convex and
non-increasing. When s = 0, Xi = Yi for all i ∈ Z+ under both hypotheses, and φ(0, 0) =
D(pX|h0||pX|h1). Intuitively, it is more difficult for the AD to identify the hypotheses when they
lead to more similar energy demand profiles. It can be observed in Fig. 3 that φ(s, s) decreases
as p˜ (resp. p¯) gets closer to the fixed p¯ (resp. p˜). Another interesting observation is that φ(s, s)
curves for different settings of energy demand statistics (p¯, p˜) might intersect. For instance, to
achieve the privacy performance of 0.6, a lower renewable energy generation rate is required for
(p¯ = 0.2, p˜ = 0.75) than that for (p¯ = 0.75, p˜ = 0.2); while to achieve the privacy performance
of 0.3, a higher renewable energy generation rate is required for (p¯ = 0.2, p˜ = 0.75) than that
for (p¯ = 0.75, p˜ = 0.2).
Under the adversarial Bayesian hypothesis test setting and using the optimal memoryless
hypothesis-aware policy, the asymptotic privacy performance ν(s, s) is shown in Fig. 4 for
different values of p¯ and p˜. Confirming the claim in Lemma 5, the asymptotic privacy performance
ν(s, s) is a convex and non-increasing function of s. From the same argument that more similar
energy demand profiles make the AD more difficult to identify the hypotheses, it follows that
ν(s, s) decreases as p˜ gets closer to the fixed p¯. Note that the “opposite” settings, (p¯ = 0.8, p˜ =
0.2), (p¯ = 0.75, p˜ = 0.2), and (p¯ = 0.7, p˜ = 0.2), are not presented here since they lead to the
same privacy performances as presented in the figure.
From the numerical results, the renewable energy generation rate that can guarantee a certain
privacy performance can be determined.
1Certain appliances have binary energy demands, e.g., a fridge with “on” and “sleep” modes.
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TABLE I
OPERATION MODES UNDER EACH HYPOTHESIS.
h
pX|h x [W]
0 200 500 1200
h0 (type A) 0.2528 0.3676 0 0.3796
h1 (type B) 0.1599 0.0579 0.2318 0.5504
D. Numerical Experiment
Here we present a numerical experiment with energy data from the REDD dataset [45] to
illustrate the practical value of our theoretic results. We consider a kitchen with a dishwasher,
which can be type A (h0) or type B (h1). From the energy data, we can identify four operation
modes of a dishwasher. Table I shows the operation modes and the corresponding statistics
obtained through training under the assumption of i.i.d. energy demands. We consider three
renewable energy generation rates: s = 0, 4000, 5000 [W]. Given a value of s and under
the adversarial Neyman-Pearson test setting, the optimal memoryless hypothesis-aware policy
is implemented on the real energy demand data under each hypothesis. The resulting energy
supplies under each hypothesis are shown in Fig. 5. When s = 0 [W], the energy supplies
exactly follow the energy demands and it is easy for the AD to identify the hypothesis from the
energy supply data. When s = 4000 [W], the optimal policy enforces that every operation mode
under hypothesis h0 and the same operation mode under hypothesis h1 are statistically similar.
When s = 5000 [W], most energy demands are satisfied from the RES, and it becomes very
difficult for the AD to identify the hypothesis from the energy supply data.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
We have proposed novel formulations for privacy problem as adversarial hypothesis tests,
where the fully-informed adversary makes an optimal hypothesis test on the privacy based on
the adversarial observations; and the management unit manipulates the original data sequence
into adversarial observations under an average distortion constraint to degrade the adversarial hy-
pothesis testing accuracy. The privacy performance is evaluated by an asymptotic error exponent
of the fully-informed adversary.
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Fig. 5. Energy supplies under each hypothesis for different renewable energy generation rates when the optimal memoryless
hypothesis-aware policy is used.
In the adversarial Neyman-Pearson hypothesis test setting, an asymptotically optimal privacy
performance is shown to be characterized by a Kullback-Leibler divergence rate. Focusing on
the worst case scenario, in which the type I probability of error upper bound approaches one,
the asymptotic exponent of the maximum minimal type II probability of error achieved by
the optimal memoryless hypothesis-aware policy is characterized by a single-letter Kullback-
Leibler divergence; and it is also shown that the optimal memoryless hypothesis-aware policy
cannot asymptotically outperform the optimal hypothesis-unaware policy with memory, since the
management unit can learn the true hypothesis with an arbitrarily small probability of error from
a sufficiently long sequence of original data. In the adversarial Bayesian hypothesis test setting,
the informed adversary is assumed to have access to the prior knowledge on the hypotheses, and
the privacy leakage is measured by the minimal error probability of the adversary. Asymptotic
results are derived on the optimal privacy performance similar to the adversarial Neyman-Pearson
hypothesis test setting by substituting Kullback-Leibler divergence with Chernoff information.
These theoretic results can be directly applied to the smart meter privacy problem, where
the energy supply alphabet can be constrained to the energy demand alphabet without loss
of optimality for the evaluation of the single-letter privacy performances in both adversarial
hypothesis test settings.
The asymptotic privacy performances derived in this work provide fundamental limits on
any practical management policy and they therefore serve as references/benchmarks useful for
the performance assessment of any practical policy. The optimal memoryless hypothesis-aware
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policy is an i.i.d. policy, which can be easily designed and implemented in practice.
APPENDIX
A. Proof of Theorem 3
Proof: Let o(n) , blog nc, c(n) , o(n)+1, q(n) , n−o(n), and dmax , maxx∈X ,y∈Y d(x, y).
We choose any δ ∈ (0, s), ω ∈ (0, s), and type I probability of error upper bound ε′ ∈
(max{0, 1 − min{D(pX|h0 ||pX|h1), δdmax}}, 1). Then set ξ = 1 − ε′ and ψ = δ − dmax · ξ. It
can be verified that 0 < ξ < D(pX|h0||pX|h1) and 0 < ψ ≤ δ. We use these parameters to
construct a hypothesis-unaware policy with memory, ρnp , over an n-slot time horizon, which
consists of two successive phases.
o(n)-slot learning phase. The goal of the MU is to learn the true hypothesis at the end of the
first phase. To prevent privacy leakage during the learning phase, identical instantaneous policies
are used at all time slots as:
yi = ρi(xi) = minY , ∀i ≤ o(n), ∀xi ∈ X .
Based on the observations of original data xo(n), the MU makes a decision Hˆ:
Hˆ =
h0, if x
o(n) ∈ Ao(n)ξ (pX|h0||pX|h1)
h1, otherwise
,
where Ao(n)ξ (pX|h0 ||pX|h1) denotes a relative entropy typical set as defined in [36], and any
sequence xo(n) ∈ Ao(n)ξ (pX|h0||pX|h1) satisfies∣∣∣∣∣ 1o(n) log pXo(n)|h0
(
xo(n)
)
pXo(n)|h1 (x
o(n))
− D(pX|h0||pX|h1)
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ ξ.
The MU can make a wrong decision. Let pe¯ = 1−pXo(n)|h0(Ao(n)ξ (pX|h0||pX|h1)) denote the type
I probability of error and pe˜ = pXo(n)|h1(Ao(n)ξ (pX|h0 ||pX|h1)) denote the type II probability of
error for the MU.
q(n)-slot privacy-preserving phase. Depending on the decision Hˆ in the learning phase,
identical instantaneous policies are used at all slots of the second phase as follows.
If Hˆ = h0 (resp. Hˆ = h1) and for all i ∈ {c(n), . . . , n}, ρi : pYi|Xi corresponds to the optimizer
p∗Y |X,h0 (resp. p
∗
Y |X,h1) of φ(s− δ, s− ω).
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Next, we check the average distortion constraint. Under hypothesis h0 (resp. h1), if a correct
decision is made at the end of the learning phase, the instantaneous management policies used
in the privacy-preserving phase guarantee that the single-slot average distortion upper bound
s− δ (resp. s−ω) is satisfied at all time slots of this phase; otherwise, bounded violation of the
single-slot average distortion constraint might happen at all time slots of the privacy-preserving
phase. When n is sufficiently large, we have
E
[
1
n
n∑
i=1
d(Xi, Yi)
∣∣∣∣∣h0
]
≤o(n)
n
dmax + E
 1
n
n∑
i=c(n)
d(Xi, Yi)
∣∣∣∣∣∣h0

(a)
≤ o(n)
n
dmax +
q(n)
n
(s− δ + dmax · ξ)
≤s− δ + dmax · ξ + o(n)
n
dmax
=s− (ψ − o(n)
n
dmax)
(b)
≤s,
and
E
[
1
n
n∑
i=1
d(Xi, Yi)
∣∣∣∣∣h1
]
≤o(n)
n
dmax + E
 1
n
n∑
i=c(n)
d(Xi, Yi)
∣∣∣∣∣∣h1

≤o(n)
n
dmax +
q(n)
n
(s− ω + dmax · pe˜)
(c)
≤s+ dmax · e−o(n)·(D(pX|h0 ||pX|h1 )−ξ) + o(n)
n
dmax − ω︸ ︷︷ ︸
∆(n)
(d)
≤s,
where (a) follows since pe¯ < ξ when o(n) is sufficiently large [36, Theorem 11.8.2]; (b) follows
since ψ− o(n)
n
dmax ≥ 0 when n is sufficiently large; (c) follows since pe˜ < e−o(n)·(D(pX|h0 ||pX|h1 )−ξ)
[36, Theorem 11.8.2]; and (d) follows since ∆(n) ≤ 0 when n is sufficiently large.
Therefore, ρnp is a management policy which satisfies the average distortion constraint in (1)
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when n is sufficiently large. Then, we have
lim inf
n→∞
1
q(n)
log
1
β(n, ε′, ρnp )
≥ lim inf
n→∞
1
n
log
1
β(n, ε′, ρnp )
≥ lim inf
n→∞
1
n
log
1
βM(n, ε′, s)
,
(44)
where the first inequality follows from q(n) ≤ n; and the second inequality follows since the
constructed management policy ρnp is not necessarily optimal for all sufficiently large n.
From the point of view of the informed AD, the observations yo(n) in the learning phase do
not reveal any information about the hypothesis. Therefore, the strategy of the AD only depends
on the observation statistics in the privacy-preserving phase pY n
c(n)
|h0 and pY nc(n)|h1 . Then, the term
1
q(n)
log 1
β(n,ε′,ρnp )
in (44) represents the exponent of the minimal type II probability of error in
the privacy-preserving phase. With the management policy ρnp specified above, the sequence
of adversarial observations in the privacy-preserving phase is a mixture of the i.i.d. sequences
Y nc(n)|Hˆ = h0, H = h0 and Y nc(n)|Hˆ = h1, H = h0 under hypothesis h0, or a mixture of the
i.i.d. sequences Y nc(n)|Hˆ = h1, H = h1 and Y nc(n)|Hˆ = h0, H = h1 under hypothesis h1. The
probability distributions are
pY n
c(n)
|h0
(
ync(n)
)
=(1− pe¯) · pY n
c(n)
|Hˆ=h0,H=h0
(
ync(n)
)
+ pe¯ · pY n
c(n)
|Hˆ=h1,H=h0
(
ync(n)
)
,
pY n
c(n)
|h1
(
ync(n)
)
=(1− pe˜) · pY n
c(n)
|Hˆ=h1,H=h1
(
ync(n)
)
+ pe˜ · pY n
c(n)
|Hˆ=h0,H=h1
(
ync(n)
)
.
We define
B(R, n) ,
ync(n)
∣∣∣∣∣∣ 1q(n) log
pY n
c(n)
|h0
(
ync(n)
)
pY n
c(n)
|h1
(
ync(n)
) ≤ R
 ,
and
K(R) , lim sup
n→∞
pY n
c(n)
|h0 (B(R, n)) .
Based on the information-spectrum results [46, Theorem 1], [37, Theorem 4.2.1], we have
sup{R|K(R) ≤ ε′} ≥ lim inf
n→∞
1
q(n)
log
1
β(n, ε′, ρnp )
. (45)
In the asymptotic regime as n→∞, Y nc(n)|h1 reduces to the i.i.d. sequence Y nc(n)|Hˆ = h1, H =
h1 since limn→∞ pe˜ ≤ limn→∞ e−o(n)·(D(pX|h0 ||pX|h1 )−ξ) = 0. Based on the case study [37, Example
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4.2.1], the upper bound sup{R|K(R) ≤ ε′} is characterized by the Kullback-Leibler divergences
D1 = D(pY |Hˆ=h0,H=h0||pY |Hˆ=h1,H=h1) and D2 = D(pY |Hˆ=h1,H=h0||pY |Hˆ=h1,H=h1) as follows.
If D1 ≥ D2, we have
D(pY |Hˆ=h0,H=h0||pY |Hˆ=h1,H=h1) ≥ sup{R|K(R) ≤ ε′};
otherwise, since 1− pe¯ > 1− ξ = ε′ as n→∞, we have
D(pY |Hˆ=h0,H=h0||pY |Hˆ=h1,H=h1) = sup{R|K(R) ≤ ε′}.
Then, it follows that
φ(s− δ, s− ω) =D(pY |Hˆ=h0,H=h0||pY |Hˆ=h1,H=h1)
≥ sup{R|K(R) ≤ ε′}.
(46)
The inequalities (44), (45), and (46) jointly lead to
φ(s− δ, s− ω) ≥ lim inf
n→∞
1
n
log
1
βM(n, ε′, s)
. (47)
Given δ, ω ∈ (0, s), the inequality (47) holds for all type I probability of error upper bounds
ε′ ∈ (max {0, 1−min{D(pX|h0||pX|h1), δdmax}}, 1). Therefore,
φ(s− δ, s− ω) ≥ lim
ε→1
lim inf
n→∞
1
n
log
1
βM(n, ε, s)
= θM(s). (48)
Since the inequality (48) holds for all δ, ω ∈ (0, s), we further have
φ(s, s) = inf
δ,ω∈(0,s)
{φ(s− δ, s− ω)} ≥ θM(s),
where the equality follows from the non-increasing and continuous properties of φ(s¯, s˜).
B. Proof of Theorem 6
Proof: Let o(n) , blog nc, c(n) , o(n) + 1, q(n) , n− o(n), dmax , maxx∈X ,y∈Y d(x, y).
We choose any δ ∈ (0, s), ω ∈ (0, s), and ξ ∈
(
0,min
{
D(pX|h0||pX|h1), δdmax
})
. Then set
ψ = δ − dmax · ξ. It can be verified that 0 < ψ < δ. We use these parameters to construct a
hypothesis-unaware management policy with memory, ρnq , over an n-slot time horizon, which
similarly has two phases as ρnp .
o(n)-slot learning phase. This phase is the same as the learning phase of ρnp : Identical
instantaneous privacy-unaware policies are independently used at all slots and always output
an adversarial observation sequence of minY regardless of the sequence of original data; and
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the learning decision at the end of this phase is Hˆ = 0 if the sequence xo(n) is in the relative
entropy typical set Ao(n)ξ
(
pX|h0||pX|h1
)
or is Hˆ = 1 otherwise. Again, we denote the type I
probability of learning error by pe¯ and the type II probability of learning error by pe˜.
q(n)-slot privacy-preserving phase. Depending on the decision Hˆ in the learning phase,
identical instantaneous management policies are used at all slots of the second phase as follows.
If Hˆ = h0 (resp. Hˆ = h1) and for all i ∈ {c(n), . . . , n}, ρi : pYi|Xi corresponds to the optimizer
p∗Y |X,h0 (resp. p
∗
Y |X,h1) of ν(s− δ, s− ω).
It follows from the same analysis on ρnp that the policy ρ
n
q satisfies the average distortion
constraint in (1) when n is sufficiently large. Similar to (44), we have
lim inf
n→∞
1
q(n)
log
1
α(n, ρnq )
≥ lim inf
n→∞
1
n
log
1
α(n, ρnq )
≥ lim
n→∞
1
n
log
1
αM(n, s)
= µM(s).
(49)
Since yo(n) in the learning phase is a deterministic sequence of minY , the strategy of the AD
only depends on the observation statistics in the privacy-preserving phase pY n
c(n)
|h0 and pY nc(n)|h1 .
Then, the term 1
q(n)
log 1
α(n,ρnq )
in (49) represents the exponent of the minimal error probability
in the privacy-preserving phase. With the management policy ρnq specified above, the sequence
of adversarial observations in the privacy-preserving phase is a mixture of the i.i.d. sequences
Y nc(n)|Hˆ = h0, H = h0 with a probability 1− pe¯ and Y nc(n)|Hˆ = h1, H = h0 with a probability pe¯
under hypothesis h0, or a mixture of the i.i.d. sequences Y nc(n)|Hˆ = h1, H = h1 with a probability
1− pe˜ and Y nc(n)|Hˆ = h0, H = h1 with a probability pe˜ under hypothesis h1. In the asymptotic
regime as n → ∞, Y nc(n)|h1 can be seen as the i.i.d. sequence Y nc(n)|Hˆ = h1, H = h1 since
limn→∞ pe˜ ≤ limn→∞ e−o(n)·(D(pX|h0 ||pX|h1 )−ξ) = 0. Then, we have
lim inf
n→∞
1
q(n)
log
1
α(n, ρnq )
=C(pY |Hˆ=h0,H=h0 , pY |Hˆ=h1,H=h1) + ∆(ξ)
=ν(s− δ, s− ω) + ∆(ξ),
(50)
where ν(s− δ, s− ω) corresponds to the asymptotic exponent of the minimal error probability
in the privacy-preserving phase if pe¯ = 0; and the term ∆(ξ) denotes the impact of the i.i.d.
sequence Y nc(n)|Hˆ = h1, H = h0 with a probability pe¯ under hypothesis h0. The inequalities (49)
and (50) jointly lead to
µM(s) ≤ ν(s− δ, s− ω) + ∆(ξ). (51)
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Since lim supn→∞ pe¯ ≤ ξ, the term ∆(ξ) satisfies
lim
ξ→0
∆(ξ) = 0. (52)
Given δ, ω ∈ (0, s), the inequality (51) holds for all ξ ∈
(
0,min
{
D(pX|h0||pX|h1), δdmax
})
.
Therefore,
µM(s) ≤ ν(s− δ, s− ω) + lim
ξ→0
∆(ξ) = ν(s− δ, s− ω). (53)
Since (53) holds for all δ, ω ∈ (0, s), we further have
µM(s) ≤ inf
δ,ω∈(0,s)
{ν(s− δ, s− ω)} = ν(s, s), (54)
where the equality follows from the non-increasing and continuous properties of ν(s¯, s˜).
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